mirror of
https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui.git
synced 2026-06-04 20:05:38 +08:00
fix: plugin svg icon sanitization (#817)
* fix(security)(components): unsanitized svg content injected via `dangerouslys The plugin icon renderer fetches SVG text from `/api/plugins/.../assets/...` and injects it directly into the DOM using `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` after only checking that the payload starts with `<svg`. This does not remove malicious attributes/elements (e.g., event handlers, scriptable SVG payloads), enabling DOM-based XSS if a plugin asset is malicious or compromised. Affected files: PluginIcon.tsx Signed-off-by: tuanaiseo <221258316+tuanaiseo@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: sanitize plugin svg icons --------- Signed-off-by: tuanaiseo <221258316+tuanaiseo@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: tuanaiseo <tuanaiseo@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Simos Mikelatos <simosmik@gmail.com>
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@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
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import { useState, useEffect } from 'react';
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import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
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import { authenticatedFetch } from '../../../utils/api';
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type Props = {
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@@ -10,6 +12,48 @@ type Props = {
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// Module-level cache so repeated renders don't re-fetch
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const svgCache = new Map<string, string>();
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const FORBIDDEN_SVG_TAGS = [
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'script',
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'foreignObject',
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'iframe',
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'object',
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'embed',
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'link',
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'meta',
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'style',
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'animate',
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'set',
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'animateTransform',
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'animateMotion',
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];
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const FORBIDDEN_SVG_ATTRS = [
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'href',
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'xlink:href',
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'src',
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'style',
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];
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function sanitizeSvg(svgText: string): string | null {
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const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(svgText, {
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USE_PROFILES: { svg: true, svgFilters: true },
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FORBID_TAGS: FORBIDDEN_SVG_TAGS,
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FORBID_ATTR: FORBIDDEN_SVG_ATTRS,
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});
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if (!sanitized) return null;
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try {
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const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(sanitized, 'image/svg+xml');
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const root = doc.documentElement;
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if (!root || root.nodeName.toLowerCase() !== 'svg') return null;
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if (doc.querySelector('parsererror')) return null;
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return sanitized;
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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export default function PluginIcon({ pluginName, iconFile, className }: Props) {
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const url = iconFile
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? `/api/plugins/${encodeURIComponent(pluginName)}/assets/${encodeURIComponent(iconFile)}`
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@@ -24,9 +68,11 @@ export default function PluginIcon({ pluginName, iconFile, className }: Props) {
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return r.text();
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})
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.then((text) => {
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if (text && text.trimStart().startsWith('<svg')) {
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svgCache.set(url, text);
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setSvg(text);
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if (!text) return;
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const sanitized = sanitizeSvg(text);
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if (sanitized) {
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svgCache.set(url, sanitized);
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setSvg(sanitized);
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}
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})
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.catch(() => {});
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@@ -35,10 +81,6 @@ export default function PluginIcon({ pluginName, iconFile, className }: Props) {
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if (!svg) return <span className={className} />;
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return (
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<span
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className={className}
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// SVG is fetched from the user's own installed plugin — same trust level as the plugin code itself
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dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: svg }}
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/>
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<span className={className} dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: svg }} />
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);
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}
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